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7 
“SEXTING” AND SURVEILLANCE: HOW SMARTPHONES 




As technology evolves, its advancement challenges courts as they 
attempt to apply long-standing legal doctrines to modern workplace con-
flicts. Emerging technological advances, such as handheld computers, 
make the personal/professional divide disappear as smartphones and tab-
lets become inexpensive investments for companies who want their 
workers available and accessible to their work around the clock.  
Our workforce is increasingly mobile, with many workers able to do 
some or all of their work from virtually anywhere. In 2013, it is expected 
that 75.5% of the American workforce will be working from somewhere 
other than a standard office at some point of their workweek,
2
 and by 
2015, it is expected that 1.2 billion global employees will be considered 
mobile workers.
3
 This “boundaryless workplace”
4
 allows for work to be 
done outside the purview of managers and supervisors at the same time 
that workers have wide access to instant communications (by way of 
social network sites, texts, and instant messages).  Employers attempt to 
stem the tide of unauthorized overtime, misuse of company data, and loss 
of trade secrets by implementing computer monitoring and surveillance.
5
 
This trend makes workplace relationships ripe for (and companies liable 
for) sexual harassment (or “textual harassment”) and privacy violations 
claims. 
TEXTUAL HARASSMENT 
In 2012, when both the Fifth Circuit and a Southern state appellate 
court reversed trial courts’ findings for employers in sexual harassment 
claims, a trend was in the making. Supervisors sexually harassing their 
  
 1. J.D., M.S.W., Lawyering Process Professor, Director of Workplace Law Program, Uni-
versity of Denver Sturm College of Law. A heartfelt thank you to Professor Chris Lasch for his 
helpful suggestions, and to my research assistant, Elizabeth Hutchinson, as well as DU Law Review 
Editor, Katy Raffensperger. 
 2. More Than One Billion Mobile Workers Worldwide by Year’s End, According to IDC, 
BUS. WIRE (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100219005085/en/Billion-
Mobile-Workers-Worldwide-Years-IDC. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Professor Kathy Stone is attributed as coining this phrase to represent the changing work-
place norms. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); Katherine V.W. 
Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773 (2002); 
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace 
for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 519 (2001). 
 5. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 
LA. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2006). 
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subordinates through inappropriate texts provide a record of behavior 
that is hard to ignore.  
The Fifth Circuit recognized the illegality of supervisors “sexting” 
subordinates and reversed the district court for failing to recognize that 
danger. In Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc.,
6
 the plaintiff was part of a sur-
vey crew for an engineering firm when his supervisor subjected him to 
crude, sexually explicit text messages.
7
 After a jury verdict in the plain-
tiff’s favor, the trial court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
the employer on the Title VII sexual harassment claim.
8
 Finding the texts 
to be explicit sexual propositioning and both severe and pervasive, the 




Similarly, in Missouri, a McDonald’s restaurant worker was subject 
to sexually explicit and threatening text messages from her supervisor.
10
 
In Reed v. McDonald’s Corp., the trial court had granted summary judg-
ment without specifying its reasoning.
11
 The Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment in favor of the employer, finding that a reasonable 
jury could find the conduct “unwelcome.”
12
  
Both appellate cases showcase the danger instant communications 
can bring to workplace relationships. From the employees’ viewpoint, 
they are increasingly vulnerable to unwanted sexual predatory advances 
even when they are away from the workplace, and they feel powerless to 
stop it without losing their jobs. For employers, harassing supervisors 
and co-workers are handed this potential avenue for illegal behavior with 
(often) company-owned equipment, while that same smartphone tech-
nology is capturing a record of harassing behavior that previously re-
mained witness-less. Many employers are responding to such potential 
legal liability with technology monitoring and surveillance of their work-
ers. 
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN A PEEPING TOM WORLD 
Given the potential liability evidenced on employees’ smartphones, 
an era of unprecedented employer monitoring and surveillance has be-
gun. While employees mistakenly believe they enjoy a privacy right in 
their smartphone communications, the law is far from clear. 
The traditional judicial approach of protecting purely personal mat-
ters, while allowing employer scrutiny of work-related activities, is prov-
  
 6. 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 7. Id. at 185–86. The supervisor also subjected the worker to unwelcome touching. Id.  
 8. Id. at 186–87 (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).  
 9. Id. at 188–90.  
 10. 363 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).  
 11. Id. at 138.  
 12. Id. at 141.  
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ing unworkable in the current workplace dynamic. The line distinguish-
ing the personal from the professional is difficult to draw when employ-
ees use the same hand-held technology to email work colleagues, text 
family members, and call doctors. Meanwhile, employers are authorizing 
IT technicians to install software that capture texts and other data onto 
the company server.  
When it comes to privacy rights, public employees enjoy greater 
freedom than their private counterparts by enforcing their Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches done by their govern-
ment employer.
13
 The Supreme Court’s most searching and relevant de-
cision on this issue is O’Connor v. Ortega,
14
 a twenty-five-year-old opin-
ion without a majority decision, established in a time when hand-held 
technology was only a promise of things to come. In Ortega, the plaintiff 
was a state hospital physician asserting a privacy right in his desk and 
file cabinets in his office.
15
 The plenary decision established a balancing 
test, testing the “operational realities of the workplace” against an em-
ployee’s privacy interests to determine whether an employee has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.
16
  
In essence, the “operational realities of the workplace” balancing 
asks courts to evaluate office policies and actual employer practices as 
the measure for evaluating the reasonableness of an employee’s privacy 
expectations.
17
 This provides employers with a perverse incentive to 
adopt a practice of regular electronic surveillance and policy of “no pri-
vacy”; accordingly, an employer alone determines the employee’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.  
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to revisit employee privacy 
in a more modern workplace in City of Ontario v. Quon (Quon III).
18
 In 
Quon, a SWAT team member asserted that he had a reasonable privacy 
expectation in his text messages sent from his government pager.
19
 The 
police department had a “no privacy” policy, but evidence revealed an 
unofficial policy of allowing personal use of pagers.
20
 Unfortunately, the 
Quon Court left unanswered the central issue of whether public employ-
ees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent on 
employer-issued devices (by assuming that the plaintiff did have a priva-
  
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 14. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).  
 15. Id. at 712, 719.  
 16. Id. at 721.  
 17. See id. at 718–19.  
 18. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).  
 19. Id. at 2626–27. As Justice Scalia commented during oral argument, these texts were 
“spicy” and not work related. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Quon III, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 
08-1332).  
 20. Quon III, 130 S. Ct. at 2626-27. 
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Meanwhile, until recently, employees that work for private employ-
ers have been left with only common law tort privacy claims. These 
causes of action look at whether there was an intentional intrusion “upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or private affairs or concerns” that is 
“highly offensive to the reasonable person.”
22
 These claims provide very 
limited relief for private employees, because courts often look to Fourth 
Amendment case law for guidance on what is objectively reasonable in 
the workplace, resulting in failed claims. Moreover, this limited relief is 
all the more unhelpful to at-will employees for risk of termination is not 
worth pursuing any perceived invasions of privacy claims. 
However, recent federal legislation has changed employee privacy 
law. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) has two major 
parts relevant to employees.
23
 Title I is the Wiretap Act, which prohibits 
interception of electronic communication, while Title II is the Stored 
Communication Act (SCA), providing civil liability for intentional ac-
cess into stored electronic communications without authorization of “a 
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided” 
or which “intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility.”
24
 
Exceptions to a valid privacy claim include consent to the interception 
and access by the provider of the communication service.
25
  
A few test cases reveal the ECPA’s limitations. In Shefts v. 
Petrakis,
26
 the president of a telecommunications company filed suit 
pursuant to the EPCA (and state privacy law) against corporate stake-
holders for authorizing installation of “spyware” software on his compa-
ny computer, laptop, and BlackBerry, which captured all his email and 
texts on the company server.
27
 The spyware was installed after senior 
management received complaints of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment of 
co-workers.
28
 The district court denied summary judgment for the plain-
tiff, holding he implicitly consented to the interception because: the 
company’s employee handbook made a policy of “no employee privacy,” 
which specifically referenced text messages; his BlackBerry device was 
a piece of company equipment; and his decision to connect his BlackBer-
ry to the company server, which he should have known could log com-
  
 21. Id. at 26, 30–31; see also Marissa Lalli, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the 
Workplace and a Call for a New Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 254 
(2011).  
 22. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B) (1977).  
 23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711 (2012). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012). 
 25. Id.  
 26. 758 F. Supp. 2d 620 (D. C.D. Ill. 2010).  
 27. Id. at 625–27. 
 28. Id. at 625.  
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munications sent from his BlackBerry, provided him with notice that all 
of his messages could be archived.
29
  
The SCA has been found equally unavailing for employees looking 
for privacy in their smartphone use.
30
 In Garcia v. City of Laredo, Tex-
as,
31
 a police dispatcher sued the police department under the SCA for 
accessing her texts and photos on her smartphone.
32
 For employers to be 
liable under the SCA, they must have gained unauthorized access to a 
facility through which electronic communication services are provided 
(or the access must have exceeded the scope of authority given) and 
thereby must have accessed electronic communications while in stor-
age.
33
 The plaintiff argued that her smartphone is a “facility” in which 
electronic communication is kept in electronic storage in the form of text 
messages and pictures stored on the cell phone.
34
 The Fifth Circuit held 
that the smartphone does not provide an “electronic communication ser-
vice” just because the device enables use of electronic communication 
services, and there was no evidence that the employer ever obtained any 
information from the cellular company; accordingly, the text messages 
and photos stored on her phone were not in “electronic storage” as de-
fined by the SCA and therefore outside the scope of the statute.
35
 
Together, the most recent cases involving smartphone usage reflect 
the dissonance between employees’ expectations about their “private” 
communications and what the law protects. While mobile workers are 
quickly becoming the norm in today’s workplace, and the whole notion 
of what constitutes a “workplace” is being challenged continually in our 
courts, the law struggles to keep up, especially in the field of workplace 
sexual harassment.  
 
  
 29. Id. at 631.  
 30. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 901 (2012).  
 31. 702 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 32. Id. at 790. 
 33. Id. at 791.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 792–93.  
